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Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs
Music Lessons
Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche

Abstract (EN): This chapter offers a critical analysis of copyright law that
integrates insights from music. The authors argue that the unique qualities
of musical works magnify the mismatch between creative practices and
copyright doctrine, and suggest that an interdisciplinary analysis can shine
a revealing light on both the problem and potential paths to improvement.
Beginning with an overview of copyright doctrine in Canada in respect of
musical works and music infringement claims, the authors then borrow
analytical concepts from the discipline of music theory to problematize
copyright’s “reasonable listener” test for determining substantial copying.
Using a specially-designed musical composition, the authors illustrate how
and why this test may fail to perform its necessary role in the infringement
analysis. The authors conclude by identifying some ways in which the legal
analysis could be improved, including a more extensive use of both expert
and survey evidence, and greater consideration of the accepted norms and
practices of the relevant creative community. The overarching aim of this
chapter is to demonstrate the importance of bringing the insights from
musical and other creative disciplines to bear on the law of copyright, so that
it might more accurately reflect the very practices it is meant to encourage.
Résumé (FR) : Ce chapitre présente une analyse critique du droit d’auteur
qui intègre des perspectives de la musique. Les auteurs soutiennent que les
qualités uniques des œuvres musicales amplifient la dissonance entre les
pratiques créatives et la doctrine du droit d’auteur, et estiment qu’une ana43
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lyse interdisciplinaire peut jeter de la lumière tant sur le problème que sur des
pistes potentielles d’amélioration. Commençant d’abord par une vue d’ensemble de la doctrine du droit d’auteur sur les œuvres musicales et des actions
en contrefaçon de la musique au Canada, les auteurs empruntent ensuite des
concepts analytiques de la théorie musicale pour problématiser le test de
« l’auditeur raisonnable » du droit d’auteur comme déterminant du copiage
substantiel. En utilisant une composition musicale spécialement créée pour
l’article, les auteurs illustrent comment et pourquoi ce test peut échouer dans
son rôle lors d’une analyse de contrefaçon. Les auteurs concluent en identifiant certains moyens par lesquels l’analyse juridique pourrait être améliorée,
notamment par l’utilisation plus extensive de preuves provenant d’experts et
de survols académiques, et avec une plus grande prise en considération des
normes et pratiques acceptées par la communauté créative touchée. Le but
principal de ce chapitre est donc de démontrer l’apport important de la musique et d’autres disciplines créatives au droit d’auteur, de sorte qu’il puisse
mieux refléter les pratiques que ce droit vise justement à encourager.

A. INTRODUCTION
It has been written that “somewhere along the line, the law of music copyright forgot to check in with the world of music.”1 Our aim, in this chapter,
is to demonstrate the importance and potential significance of “checking
in” with the world of music when considering the application of copyright
doctrine to musical works. While this assertion applies with equal force to
every aspect of the copyright inquiry — from definitions of originality to adjudications of fair dealing — our focus will be on the determination of substantial similarity in music copyright infringement cases, and in particular,
on the so-called “recognizability” test.
We argue that the test for copyright infringement of musical works reveals a disconnect between the nature and processes of musical creation
on one hand, and on the other hand, the vision of music and composition
that informs the law. By highlighting this disconnect, we make a broader
claim that the law does not, therefore, adequately account for the unique
nature of music as a subject matter of copyright. This failure may produce
regrettable results, both in terms of the practical application of the law in
1

J Michael Keyes, “Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection” (2004) 10:4 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 407 at 430.
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copyright cases, and in the way it is experienced by those in the musical
arena. Our suspicion is that musical expression suffers more acutely than
other forms of intellectual expression in the face of copyright’s conceptual
constraints. In a normative sense, common creative activities may be devalued and delegitimized as a result of the gap between cultural and legal
norms. In a practical sense, creative processes may be stymied or chilled by
the operation, or merely the spectre, of the law.
From a copyright policy perspective, moreover, the law’s failure to account for the inherent qualities of music potentially undermines its capacity to advance the purposes of the copyright system — rewarding authors
encouraging the creation and dissemination of “works of the arts and intellect”2 — by upsetting the copyright balance. The problems we identify here
may illustrate a more pervasive failure of our copyright system to adequately
reflect and encourage creative processes as they occur in specific social and
cultural contexts. These broader themes deserve more expansive consideration. For now, our modest goal is to problematize the application of copyright’s infringement test in the musical sphere, to illustrate the importance of
bringing music theory into the realm of copyright theory, and perhaps to hint
at the greater discord that accompanies the legal concepts at play.
We begin, in Section B, with an overview of copyright doctrine in Canada, and its application to musical works and music infringement claims.
In Section C we explain some basics of musical structure and composition
to critically analyze this legal formula, and use a specially modelled composition to demonstrate some of the problems with its application. We conclude, in Section D, by identifying practical and policy lessons that can be
drawn from the musical analysis, as well as offering general observations
about the importance of bringing insights from musical disciplines to bear
on the law of copyright.

B. THE LAW OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
1) Why Music Is Special
Musical works, while different in nature from other categories of copyrightable works, are subject to the same legal principles. Copyright’s onesize-fits-all model means that, notwithstanding the unique characteristics
of any particular form of intellectual expression, the legal rules are applied
2

Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc, 2002 SCC 34 at para 30.
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across the board. The test for originality — whether a work involved the exercise of non-trivial skill and judgment3 — applies equally to works of visual
art and television listings. The distinction between general ideas and more
specific authorial expression remains the same for a dramatic play or computer software code. Significantly, the determination of what constitutes a
substantial part of a work involves the same considerations when applied
to a cartoon character brooch and the film of a marching band.4 In one
sense, the broad applicability of copyright principles is the law’s greatest
strength. It has allowed copyright to adapt to vast changes in our cultural
and technological environment, evolving from a limited right to copy books
into a global system that defines legal rights over intellectual expression
in the digital age. In another sense, however, general copyright principles
overlook the specific dimensions of particular kinds of expressive activities and their cultural context. To the extent that the nature of music and
the realities of its creation and enjoyment raise unique considerations, the
copyright system should, we suggest, offer a more tailored legal approach
consistent with its broader policy goals.
The claim that music is in some way unique amongst the categories of
works that copyright protects seems at once obvious and in need of some
justification. We see broadly four ways in which music differs, at least in degree if not in form, from most other types of copyrighted works. The first is
that perhaps more than any other art form, music is engaged with and realized through its performance.5 Music does not develop on paper, nor is it
interacted with via visual or tactile means. Rather, the most basic medium
of music involves sound waves sent through the air into the ears of an audience and experienced over time. The work does not simply exist as a painting might, it must be brought to life every time it is to be experienced. “[I]n
no other type of art does time form so much the basis of, and is so strongly interwoven in, any aspect of artistic manifestation than in music.”6 Few
people are just as satisfied to quietly read a musical score, in the way that

3
4
5

6

CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para 16 [CCH].
King Features Syndicate Inc v O and M Kleeman Ltd, [1941] AC 417 HL; Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service Ltd, [1934] 1 Ch 593 [Hawkes & Son].
We note in passing that choreography is similarly a performance-based media, realized
through dance, typically to music. It would not be surprising to find that it shares with
music some of the copyright problems that we identify.
Andreas Rahmatian, “Music and Creativity as Perceived by Copyright Law” (2005) 3
Intellectual Property Quarterly 267 at 272–73 [footnote omitted].
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they would a book, as they are to attend a performance of the work or listen
to a recording; performances in music are just better.
Second, music affords biological benefits that elude common understanding. It is not especially surprising that music helps refine the brain’s
processing of sounds,7 but musicians’ accrued abilities in the learning of
foreign languages8 and in mathematical thinking9 are somewhat more
astounding. While engagement with any art will refine the senses used
to interact with the art,10 music is special insofar as it trains the brain in
areas seemingly unrelated to music itself. The neurological, physiological,
and psychological responses that hearing music can generate are also well
documented and remarkable.11 Such studies support what we might intuitively know to be true: “More so than any other artistic endeavours, music
possesses ethereal qualities that infiltrates and permeates multiple facets of
our existence in a complex manner.”12
Third, music is a language in its own right. The field of music theory
seeks to illuminate how this language works, but one need not be a music
theorist to grasp the field’s basic truths; after all, even people with little
musical education can tell when young children learning to play their instruments have accidentally hit the “wrong” note. There is something about
the sound that we know does not belong, even though the vast majority of
us could not explain why that note is incorrect whereas the one next to it
on the keyboard sounds “right.” If the sounds of the language of music are
familiar, its mechanics are not.
Fourth, and most importantly for copyright, borrowing and copying
among musicians is commonplace in the music world and an accepted part
of musical practice. For the most part, taking someone else’s musical idea and
developing it in a new way is largely understood as part of musical culture
and thus entirely consistent with cultural norms.13 In fact, the relatedness of

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Alexandra Parbery-Clark et al, “Musician Enhancement for Speech-In-Noise” (2009)
30:6 Ear & Hearing 653.
Patrick CM Wong et al, “Musical Experience Shapes Human Brainstem Encoding of
Linguistic Pitch Patterns” (2007) 10:4 Nature Neuroscience 420.
Kathryn Vaughn, “Music and Mathematics: Modest Support for the Oft-Claimed Relationship” (2000) 34:3/4 Journal of Aesthetic Education 149.
Reading novels or poetry improves one’s reading skills, cooking refines one’s palette, etc.
See Keyes, above note 1 at 420–23; see generally Daniel J Levitin, This is Your Brain on
Music: The Science of a Human Obsession (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).
Keyes, above note 1 at 420–21 [footnote omitted].
Ibid at 427 (offering numerous examples).
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musical ideas is a core theme of the study of music composition. Contemporary classical composers study concepts such as musical unity and variation in the works of the great masters. In jazz, studying “standards” and their
re-composition according to performers’ unique musical tastes drives much
musical education and innovation. “Covers” in popular music fulfill the same
goals, albeit in a different style. Sampling and digital manipulation in hiphop music also exemplify transformative re-use and its centrality in modern
music-making.14 In some sense, music creation depends on the borrowing and
adaptation of material passed from one musician to another. This is not to
suggest, of course, that musicians are the only artists who borrow from one
another, and that only music is therefore worthy of special consideration in
copyright; copyright law generally assumes a romantic vision of independent origination that sits uneasily with the realities of human creativity and
culture at large.15 Yet, the combination of a clear and established culture of
musical borrowing, together with the special characteristics of musical expression (the importance of genres, performance techniques, and aural perception in particular), magnifies the mismatch between creative practice and
the structures (and strictures) of copyright law.
Taken as a whole, these features suggest that we do not engage with
music in the same way that we engage with the visual or literary arts, nor
does music engender only musical appreciation. There is something more
fundamental in the nature of musical expression and the human response
that it generates. The features of musical culture and the ubiquity of musical borrowing reveal a dramatic divergence between the shared norms and
practices of music culture and a doctrinal copyright approach.16 Hence,
there is something to be said about music as a unique category within copyright, both deserving and in need of special consideration.
14

15

16

Use of prior recordings as the musical object for transformation presents another layer
of copyright issues relating to the “neighbouring rights” of performers and sound
recording makers (see Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, ss 15–21 [Copyright Act]). In
order to focus on prima facie infringement of copyright in musical works, we exclude
neighbouring rights issues from our analysis. Note that the potential for the assertion
of neighbouring rights to prevent de minimis uses and fair dealing with recorded music
is another highly problematic feature of copyright law in the realm of music: see, for
example, Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films, 410 F 3d 792 (6th Cir 2005).
For a critique of copyright law’s vision of the author, originality, and cultural practices,
see Carys J Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a Relational Theory of
Copyright Law (Northamption, MA: Edward Elgar Press, 2011).
See Keyes, above note 1 at 426–30; see also Olufunmilayo B Arewa, “From JC Bach to Hip
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context” (2006) 84:2 NC L Rev 547.
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2) Copyright’s Original Musical Work
Copyright law protects “every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work.”17 A musical work is defined, tautologically, as “any work of music
or musical composition, with or without words . . . .”18 Of course, music (like
art) has no intrinsic definition, and which sounds count as “music” is inherently contestable.19 As a cultural category, music is whatever we, in our
shared culture, designate as such; as a legal category, the same is now true.
Prior to a 1993 amendment, the statutory definition included only “any
combination of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to
writing or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced.”20 By departing
from the requirement of melody or harmony, the amended definition
opened the door to more experimental, less traditional forms of auditory
expression. It also dislodged the assumption that musical works must be
fixed as graphical reproductions or sheet music for copyright to vest.21 As
with all copyrightable expression, some form of physical embodiment or
“fixation” is required, but this can be achieved through virtually any means
of recording. Importantly, the work is not reducible to its fixed form; as a
legal category, the musical work refers to the composition per se, and not to
any particular interpretation or performance thereof.22
Although a musical work may be protected by copyright, not every element of that work will belong to the copyright owner. As with any kind of
work, critical aspects may belong to the public domain. Thus, non-original
17
18
19

20
21

22

Copyright Act, above note 14, s 5(1).
Ibid, s 2.
See Michael W Carroll, “Whose Music is it Anyway? How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property” (2004) 72:4 U Cin L Rev 1405. “Music has no intrinsic
definition. It is a cultural category consisting of any sounds that those in a society or culture designate as ‘music’ instead of ‘noise,’ along with any notation, recording, or other
means of capturing or representing such sounds” at 1417.
Copyright Act, above note 14, s 2, as amended by SC 1993, c 23, s 1.
See Composers, Authors & Publishers Association of Canada Ltd v CTV Television Network Ltd,
[1968] SCR 676 at 680. Justice Pigeon held that transmission of a television signal did not
infringe the copyright in a musical work, since musical works, as defined by the Act, consisted of only graphical reproductions of melody and harmony; broadcasting a television
signal communicated a “performance of the works,” not the “works” themselves.
A performer’s performance and its sound recording are protected by a “neighbouring
rights” regime. The relationship between the performance and the musical work is less
clear than this distinction implies: see Keyes, above note 1 at 428–29; Newton v Diamond, 204 F Supp (2d) 1244 (2002); Olufunmilayo B Arewa, “Writing Rights: Copyright’s
Visual Bias and African American Music” (2012) UC Irvine School of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 2012-9, online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2010024.
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elements of a musical work, whether borrowed from another work or from
the “common stock” of musical compositions, are not within the scope
of the owner’s right. The use of arpeggios in major or minor keys, for example, cannot give rise to a copyright interest in the arpeggio, which has
been a building block of classical Western music for hundreds of years. The
process of selecting or arranging common elements using more than trivial skill and judgment will produce a copyrightable work;23 the copyright
owner cannot, however, lay claim to those elements of the work that are not
her original contribution.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the ideas contained in the work are not protected by copyright, but only the expression of these ideas. The critical legal
line between ideas and expression is never easy to draw, but in the case of
musical works the distinction is particularly elusive. The exclusion of abstract
ideas from copyright’s scope means that no one can claim an exclusive right
to produce songs about, say, falling in love. It also precludes the monopolization of any genre of music, compositional methodology, or general pattern
or structure (verse-chorus-verse-chorus-bridge-verse, for example). Copyright’s scènes à faire doctrine excludes from protection any elements of a work
that are mandatory or customary to the work’s genre. In the musical context,
the doctrine ensures that customary refrains, common chord progressions,
scales, and musical metres remain in the public domain. Copyright’s “merger” doctrine further ensures that, where a musical expression merges with
the idea (because the idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways),
the expression will not be protected.24 Admittedly, the “considerable difficulty” with the application of the merger doctrine that Justice Reed described
in Apple Computers Inc v Mackintosh Computers Ltd resonates in the musical
context: it might be said that musical works, like poems and paintings, necessarily “exhibit a merger of the idea they convey and the expression thereof
. . . .” unless the idea communicated “is described in highly abstract, remote
and general terms . . . .”25 There is no clear answer to the question of when, in
music, idea and expression can be said to have merged.
Also unclear is the practical significance of the claim that the idea-expression dichotomy leaves others free to express anew the same musical
ideas. Whereas in dealings with literary expression, it is a common and sim23
24
25

CCH, above note 3 at para 16.
See, for example, Morrisey v Procter & Gamble, 379 F 2d 675 (1st Cir 1967); Delrina Corp v Triolet Systems Inc, [1993] OJ No 319 (Gen Div), aff’d (2002), 58 OR (3d) 339 (CA) [Delrina Corp].
Apple Computers Inc v Mackintosh Computers Ltd, [1987] 1 FC 173 at 187.

Out of Tune • 51

ple practice to abstract and reformulate ideas into non-infringing expression (what we might typically think of as paraphrasing), the reformulation
of musical ideas into non-infringing musical expression (wherein the original musical expression is not substantially recognizable) is more challenging. A written statement can readily be expressed in different words but
retain the original meaning or idea; it is hard to conceptualize how different
musical works could communicate a musical idea that is substantially the
same without sounding substantially similar. Said otherwise, a sufficiently
different musical expression will almost necessarily express a different idea.
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in the application of copyright doctrine to musical works, the principles that limit the reach of an
owner’s rights are fundamental to the copyright system as a whole, and the
balance it must strike. In light of the unique characteristics of music already
identified, it is tempting to claim that the limits of copyright and the free
accessibility of public domain material are of particular importance in the
context of musical works. Copyright infringement claims in this context
must be carefully examined to ensure that the law does not, in substance or
effect, unduly restrict creative musical practices.

3) Copyright Infringement in Canada
It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent
of the copyright owner, any act that is within the owner’s exclusive rights.26
There are two necessary components to copyright infringement: first, there
must in fact have been copying of the plaintiff’s work; second, the amount
copied must be of all or a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work. In the United
States’ jurisprudence, these two components have been helpfully labelled as
(1) actual copying, and (2) illicit (or unlawful) copying.27 The bifurcated test
underscores two essential propositions: the act of copying is not inherently
unlawful, but will infringe copyright only when it amounts to a substantial
taking; and a substantially similar work is not necessarily infringing, but will
infringe copyright only where the similarity is the result of copying.
26

27

The owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof
in any material form whatever; to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in
public; and, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof: see Copyright Act, above note 14, ss 3(1) and 27(1).
Arnstein v Porter, 154 F 2d 464 (2d Cir 1946), aff’d on rehearing 158 F 2d 795 (2d Cir 1946)
[Porter]; for a more detailed analysis of the two-step test, see Mark A Lemley, “Our Bizarre
System for Proving Copyright Infringement” (2010) 57:4 J Copyright Soc’y USA 719 at 719.
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a) Proof of Copying
With regard to the requirement of actual copying, there is rarely direct evidence that the defendant composed her music with the plaintiff’s work before her or playing in her ears. Rather, to establish copying on the balance
of probabilities requires proof that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work together with a sufficient objective similarity between the two
works.28 The similarities between the works must be the result of a causal
connection such that the original is the source of the copy.29
Access to the original could be shown by presenting evidence that the
defendant attended a performance or received a copy of the plaintiff’s work.
A causal connection could also be demonstrated through evidence of the
popularity or broad dissemination of the work.30 Arguably, the greater the
degree of similarity between the two works at issue, the less is required of
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had access to the original work.
Some American cases have gone so far as to find that, where the similarity
is so “striking” as to preclude the possibility of independent creation, access
may be inferred.31 However, it should be stressed that, without a causal connection, there is no copying, and any similarities must be the result of coincidence and should not give rise to liability.32 In the Internet age, even this
stricter evidentiary requirement to prove access may have lost some of its
significance; any work available online is a work to which access would be
at least possible, and certainly difficult to disprove.33 This new reality raises
the specter of findings of copying based almost entirely on the high degree
of similarity between musical works. Once sufficient objective similarity
and causal connection are established, it is no defence for the defendant to
28
29
30
31

32
33

Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bron, [1963] Ch 587 [Francis Day]; Gondos v Hardy et al, Gondos
v Toth (1982), 64 CPR (2d) 145 [Hardy].
See generally Boutin v Distributions CLB Inc, [1992] 46 CPR (3d) 395 (QCA); appeal allowed
(1994), 54 CPR (3d) 160 (SCC).
For example, Bright Tunes Music v Harrisongs Music, 420 F Supp 177 (SDNY 1976) [Harrisongs].
Heim v Universal Pictures Co, 154 F 2d 480 (2d Cir 1946); Jones v Supreme Music Corp, 101
F Supp 989 (SDNY 1951) at 990. This approach can be contrasted with the famous dicta
of Lord Diplock in Francis Day, above note 28, and was explicitly rejected by the Ontario
court in Hardy, above note 28.
Hardy, ibid at para 34, citing Lord Diplock in Francis Day, above note 28 at 624.
See Ann Bartow, “Copyrights and Creative Copying” (2003–2004) 1 U Ottawa L & Tech J
75 at 83–84, quoting Karen Bevill, “Note: Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the
Access Requirement Lost Its Probative Value?” (1999) 52:1 Rutgers L Rev 311 at 311–12; although the defendant does not bear the legal burden of disproving infringement, in the
face of substantial similarity, the tactical burden may shift to the defendant to provide
some other explanation for objective similarities.
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claim that she did not know she was copying. Because neither knowledge
nor intent is a requirement for infringement liability, it has been held that
even unconscious copying may result in a finding of infringement.34
The assessment of objective similarity in this part of the infringement
test is conducted with a view to determining the probability of copying. It
is appropriate to have regard not only to a note-to-note comparison of the
works, but also to the “effect on the ear” of the works.35 A court may be prepared to infer copying where the degree of similarity between two works “is
such that an ordinary reasonably experienced listener might think that perhaps one had come from the other.”36 It is widely accepted that there is also
an important role here for expert evidence.37 The appropriate conclusion to
be drawn from apparent similarities between two musical works is a highly
technical determination. It may be shown with the use of expert testimony
that a striking similarity produced by the repetition of a particular note sequence, for example, is not probative of copying, but rather indicative of a
common source or reliance on a compositional trope.38 By the same token,
an expert musicologist may convince the court that an apparently minor
similarity is good evidence of copying in light of the uniqueness or idiosyncrasy of the portion reproduced.
b) Proof of Copying a “Substantial Part”
It is a fundamental principle of copyright that there is no inherent legal
wrong in copying per se, but only in the copying of a whole work or a substantial part thereof. Where copying is established, then, the next question
is how much and what has been copied.
The determination of substantial copying involves an assessment of
both the quality and quantity of the portion copied in relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole. The addition of significant original content or the
relative insignificance of the copied portion in the defendant’s work are not,

34
35

36
37
38

See, for example, Francis Day, above note 28 at 600; Hardy, above note 28; Harrisongs,
above note 30; Fred Fisher Inc v Dillingham, 298 F 145 at 147 (SDNY 1924).
Francis Day, above note 28 at 608, Willmer J, citing in support Austin v Columbia Gramophone Co Ltd (1923), Macg CC (1917–1923) 398 at 409 and 415, Justice Astbury stating that
infringement is to be determined “by the ear as well as by the eye”.
Francis Day, above note 28 at 596.
See Porter, above note 27 at 468.
See, for example, Arnstein v Edward B Marks Music Corp, 82 F 2d 275 (2d Cir 1936); see also
Darrell v Joe Morris Music, 113 F 2d 80 (2d Cir 1940).
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strictly speaking, grounds for refusing to find prima facie infringement.39
Creative borrowing does not make borrowing lawful.
Perhaps the muddiest part of copyright’s infringement doctrine, in
application at least, is the integrated analysis of the substantiality of the
taking in quantitative and qualitative terms. In Hawkes & Son40 the court
found infringement of copyright in “Colonel Bogey’s March” when a quantitatively small portion of the musical work was reproduced in a newsreel.
The Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of Eve J, who had rejected the
plaintiff’s claim on grounds that the part copied was merely twenty seconds
of the whole work, which would run for about four minutes. On appeal,
Slesser LJ found that “other matters beyond mere quantity may and have to
be looked at . . . .”41 No matter how brief, part of a musical work is substantial if it is “a vital, and an essential part . . . .”42 Justice Romer agreed that
a substantial portion of the work was copied when “the principle air” was
reproduced; “the air which every one who heard the march played through
would recognize as being the essential air . . . .”43 Following the reasoning
of the court in Hawkes & Son, the Ontario High Court of Justice in Canadian Performing Right Society Ltd v Canadian National Exhibition Association44
confirmed that, in Canada, “it is not merely by comparing the respective
lengths of the whole work and of the part played that one is to reach a decision as to whether the part played is a substantial part . . . .”45 The court was
satisfied that a substantial part of the work was performed on the basis that
“the part played was recognizable and in fact recognized . . . .”46
According to this so-called “recognizability test,” if a part taken would
be recognized by an ordinary, reasonable person familiar with the work,
then that taking is substantial and may infringe copyright. In the United
States, under the Porter two-part test, the key to determining whether copying amounted to an illicit appropriation is “whether defendant took from
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who
39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

The extent to which the plaintiff’s work has been recontextualized or transformed may
be of legal significance in the determining the availability of a fair dealing defence. See
Copyright Act, above note 14, s 29.1; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
Canada v Bell, 2012 SCC 36 at para 24 [Bell].
Hawkes & Son, above note 4.
Ibid at 606.
Ibid.
Ibid at 609.
[1934] OR 610.
Ibid at 614.
Ibid.
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comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”47 Similarly, in the Canadian case of Preston v 20th Century Fox Canada
Ltd,48 which concerned the alleged copying of a movie script, the Federal
Court described the test of substantial similarity as involving an assessment
of “ultimately whether the average lay observer, at least one for whom the
work is intended, would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”49
The “average lay observer” test for determining copying of a “substantial
part” is effectively copyright’s equivalent to tort law’s “reasonable person”
test. Keyes suggests that this is a curious cameo by the reasonable person,
whose historical and philosophical underpinnings “illustrate that this construct is a fish out of the common law waters that has been blindly cast into
the music copyright infringement sea.”50 Whereas the legal function of the
reasonable person is to represent social norms and minimum standards of
behaviour in a community, copyright’s reasonable listener does not gauge
the conduct of the litigating parties; he merely determines how two works
are likely to be perceived by an ordinary member of the intended audience.
As Keyes cautions, “there is no accepted ‘social norm’ that would provide
any meaningful standard on how a piece of music would be perceived by a
‘reasonable listener.’”51 This is because “music perception is an inherently
subjective process that differs from individual to individual.”52
Irina Manta further warns that the reasonable listener test in music
infringement cases is vulnerable to all of the vagaries, biases, and misperceptions to which the reasonable person test is demonstrably prone.53
Specifically, she argues, the substantiality determination lends itself to
hindsight bias, such that a finding of copying, for example, will influence a
decision maker to find substantial similarity.54 Furthermore, the copyright
inquiry can be distorted by an “anchoring bias” (whereby the plaintiff’s original work becomes the “anchor” against which the defendant’s work is
47
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Porter, above note 27 at 473.
[1990] FCJ No 1011, 33 CPR (3d) 242 (TD), aff’d (1994), 53 CPR (3d) 407 (FCA) [Preston].
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Keyes, above note 1 at 431.
Ibid at 432.
Ibid.
Irina D Manta, “Reasonable Copyright” (2012) 53:4 BC L Rev 1303.
Ibid at 1339, citing Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives”
(2009) 122:6 Harv L Rev 1569 at 1631.
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measured55), and “confirmation bias” (which leads a decision maker to favour a finding that confirms “existing beliefs, expectations or the hypothesis at hand”56). Each of these potential biases in the application of the lay
listener infringement test tends towards favouring the plaintiff who alleges
unlawful copying over the defendant tasked with refuting the claim.57
In addition to such principled and practical objections to the “average
lay listener” test, considered in greater detail below, the test raises challenging questions about the role and relevance of expert testimony in music
infringement cases. Applying the reasoning in Porter, at this second stage
of the infringement determination, expert evidence is inappropriate. To
the extent that it has been admitted by some courts, its (somewhat counterintuitive) role has been restricted to supporting a conclusion about the likely response of the reasonable listener.58 Mark Lemley convincingly argues
that the availability of expert evidence in determinations of copying and
its effective exclusion in respect to unlawful appropriation “has the analysis of proof exactly backwards . . . .”59 The ordinary, lay listener may be well
equipped to decide whether copying is likely in light of the degree of objective similarity between two works; the question of what has been copied and
the legal significance of that copying, however, requires careful dissection of
the plaintiff’s work to separate protectable from non-protectable elements.
Whereas the reasonable listener might discern copying from the similarities
in the “aural appeal” of works taken as a whole, the lay listener will not — and
likely cannot — parse musical ideas from expression, distinguish between
original and borrowed musical elements, separate musical composition
from performance techniques, or disregard commonplace compositional
features. In short, the degree of legal complexity inherent in the substantiality determination makes it ill-suited to a reasonable person inquiry.60
This problem is compounded by the question that the average lay observer is notionally answering: is the plaintiff’s work recognizable in the
defendant’s work? The mere recognizability of a work does not adequately
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address the critical question of whether the part taken is a part that copyright
protects. Musical ideas, non-original melodies, famous riffs, commonplace
rhythms, generic chord progressions — all of these may be recognizable to
the average listener, but none is legally relevant to the infringement determination. By focusing on whether the part taken can or cannot be recognized, the test fails to distinguish the protected from the public domain. The
difficulty with the test is not merely one of potential overprotection of the
plaintiff; by the same token, substantial original musical expression may
in fact be copied without being recognizable to the average untrained ear.
Simply put, there are grounds for concern that copyright’s test for determining infringement of musical works bears little relationship either to
the appropriate legal inquiry or to the specificities of the subject matter at
issue. In the following section, we turn to the world of music to highlight
the nature and extent of these gaps in the law’s approach to finding musical
infringement.

C. SECOND GUESSING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
It is our argument that judicial assessments of musical similarity and recognizability at best distort, and in some cases radically depart from, the standards
of music communities. By examining aspects of music theory61 — alongside
research into musical psychology62 — we identify below some serious flaws
that, in combination, suggest that current methods of evaluating claims of
music copyright infringement are deeply problematic. A specially designed
composition illustrates many of these problems.

1) Determining Similarity
As noted by Keyes, there is no such thing as an accepted social norm on how
musical similarities should be perceived for copyright purposes.63 This is
61
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Don Michael Randel, ed, The New Harvard Dictionary of Music (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1986). Matthew Brown defines music theory as “the
abstract principles embodied in music and the sounds of which it consists” sub verbo
“theory” at 844; see also Patrick McCreless, “Contemporary Music Theory and the New
Musicology: An Introduction” (1997) 15:3 Journal of Musicology 291.
Diana Deutsch et al, “Psychology of Music” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online
(Oxford University Press), that is, “the discipline that studies individual human musical
thought and behaviour from a scientific perspective” at introduction.
Keyes, above note 1 at 432.
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far from the only challenge faced by the lay listener test in its determination
of objective similarity. We focus on two particular problems: how aural determinations of similarity are easily manipulable; and how straightforward
assessments of similarity fail to address the significance of the similarity in
musical terms, with the result that they fail to distinguish the musical scène
à faire from the protected musical expression.
It may seem to be stating the obvious to say that the lay listener test
privileges an aural appreciation of music. But it bears emphasis that an uncritical acceptance of hearing-based evaluations of music may undermine
the validity of such tests by conflating musical expression with what is
aurally apparent. Jamie Lund suggests that the aural appreciation of music
can be deeply flawed, and is more directed by similarity of timbre64 than
the similarity or prominence of musical events.65 Simply put, two melodies
sound more similar when they are played by the same instrument. Music
psychologists back Lund’s findings, with Carterette and Kendall agreeing
that “[h]armonically related spectra [i.e., timbre] reinforce the sense of
musical pitch . . . .”66 This means that aural similarity is not necessarily the
same thing as musical similarity, counterintuitive as this may seem. Our
ears are biologically hardwired to believe two violin melodies are more alike
than two melodies for two different instruments. This is not an absolute
standard; timbre is only one part of the determination. Still, the fact that
timbral similarities affect judgments of pitch-based similarity is important
information for a court tasked by copyright law with determining whether two pitch-based melodies (or even harmonies, rhythms, etc.) sound the
same — not whether they feature the same instrument. Musical laypersons
are more likely to conflate the two because of their unspecialized understanding of music. This matters because the overwhelming majority of
music copyright litigation features popular music, which rarely strays from
its basic instrumental setup of a vocalist, an electric guitar, a bass guitar,
and a drum kit. The influence of timbre on judgments of pitch-based music64

65
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Timbre is the quality of a sound that makes a trumpet sound like a trumpet, and a piano
sound like a piano (and not like a trumpet). Both the trumpet and piano can be playing
the same note, but their respective timbres allow us to differentiate one instrument from
the other.
See, generally, Jamie Lund, “An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music
Composition Copyright Infringement” (2011) 11:1 Va Sports & Ent LJ 137 at 171.
Edward C Carterette & Roger A Kendall, “Comparative Music Perception and Cognition”
in Diana Deutsch, ed, The Psychology of Music, 2d ed (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999) at
762.
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al similarity, and the fallibility of the human ear that it reveals, suggests that
the lay listener test should, at the very least, be supplemented by additional,
non-aural kinds of musical analysis.
This is not to say, of course, that the lay ear is incapable of good musical observations. Bright Tunes Music Corp v Harrisongs67 is an excellent case
study in this regard. In comparing George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” to
The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine,” Owen J correctly noted:
“He’s So Fine,” recorded in 1962, is a catchy tune consisting essentially of
four repetitions of a very short basic musical phrase, “sol-mi-re,” (hereinafter motif A), altered as necessary to fit the words, followed by four repetitions of another short basic musical phrase, “sol-la-do-la-do,” (hereinafter
motif B).68

In this particular instance, Owen J discovered musical form through listening (that is, he perceived by ear the sequencing of musical events in time).
He later remarked that “My Sweet Lord” uses a similar form. What Owen J
did next is of critical importance: he assessed the musical significance of
the similarity he identified, relying on experts’ testimony to conclude that
such a form represents “a highly unique pattern.”69 Regrettably, few judges
include this step in the lay listener test; after all, as previously noted, the
lay listener test is supposed to represent a non-expert view of the music.
But Owen J correctly appreciates that, without assessing the musical significance of a similarity, he has no way to tell if it is common stock or “a highly
unique pattern.” Said otherwise, he has no basis on which to determine if
the similarity is probative of unlawful copying. A survey of copyright infringement cases, as well as descriptions of the lay listener test, confirm that
Owen J’s vital extra step is often lost in music copyright actions.70
This point leads to the second core problem: the significance of identified similarities. Some aspects of musical composition, regardless of genre,
are inherently alike. Probably the best example of this is the notion of “con-
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Harrisongs, above note 30.
Ibid at 178 [footnotes omitted].
Ibid. We disagree with this assessment in musical terms, but for our purposes it is more
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A small sampling includes: Hawkes & Son, above note 4; Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell &
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cluding functions.”71 Concluding functions in music fulfill the same role as
the period in written language: they mark the end of a complete musical
thought. Instead of doing so through symbolic means as does language, or
a lowering of vocal intonation and short pause when speaking, concluding
functions in music are harmonically constructed around a limited number of
chord sequences, the appearance of which marks the end of a musical phrase.
While the harmonies of concluding functions may vary from style to style—
Mozart’s concluding functions are unlike Led Zeppelin’s—the notion of the
concluding function remains constant. A common concluding function in
rock music sees the chord of IV move to the chord of I in a certain metric
disposition (that is, the relationship of strongly and weakly stressed beats).
Many rock phrases end with this “cadence.” To an astute but context-ignorant
layperson in court, two rock phrases in two contested works may thus appear
similar because both phrases end with the same harmonic pattern; harmonies necessarily affect the selection of consonant pitches that can be used in the
melody, meaning phrase endings often feature the same notes in a particular
style of music. Additionally, rhythmic activity in the music slows at phrase
endings. Hence, a layperson might conclude that similar phrase endings in
two contested melodies represent strong evidence of copying. It would be a
reasonable conclusion for the average listener to draw, given her knowledge,
but it would be dreadfully wrong in music — as wrong as concluding that one
fairy tale is copied from another because both end with “happily ever after.”
Many of the similarities in “aural appeal” that might give rise to a finding
of copying simply cannot support it. Without sufficient appreciation of the
musical significance of apparent similarities, the fundamental distinction
between independent creation and unlawful copying cannot be satisfactorily
drawn. The understanding that music theory brings to copyright cases is not
merely "interesting but extraneous" information; it is vital to upholding some
of copyright’s most foundational norms. The lay listener test circumvents
music theory, thus bypassing critical steps in the infringement inquiry—
steps that are of recognized importance in respect of other expressive forms.72
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We borrow the terms of music theorist William Caplin here, from his study of
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a beginning, middle, and end — are present in all styles of music: see William Caplin,
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2) Determining Recognizability
It is with regard to determinations of “recognizability” that the lay listener
test takes on its primary importance; after all, if recognizability is the key
to establishing substantial copying, then it does not matter how great the
similarities between two works are unless they can be recognized aurally
by the average lay listener. Two scenarios require special consideration of
the ramifications of this test: first, a situation where copying has occurred
but goes unrecognized; and second, when copying has not occurred, but
some similarities between two works are nonetheless recognizable. To help
illustrate the problems that emerge from each scenario, consider this model
composition, which we have specially prepared for this purpose:
Figure 2.1
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A recording of the work is available for readers’ benefit,73 and we encourage
readers to listen to the composition a few times. The first few times one listens to the work, there is nothing particularly special about it. It sounds like
something your talented nephew might play. Almost certainly, no copyright
issues are immediately apparent.
Yet, that initial impression is mistaken. The composition is replete with
instances of potential infringement. Key phrases from four extremely wellknown musical works were copied and inserted into the work — not all of
them currently protected by copyright, but for our purposes, let us suppose
that they are. We openly admit that we copied musical expression from other
sources, and that, were the purposes of the work not to make an academic
point but rather to reap riches of our creative genius, then we might be found
liable for copyright infringement. Such admissions, however, have no bearing on the recognizability of the copied melodies. Their timbres are different,
heard on a piano instead of their original performing forces; the musical segments fulfill different musical functions, where a melody is transformed into
a bass line, or an initiating function (similar to a concluding function, except
marking the beginning of a musical phrase) is shifted into a different syntactical role; or the metric alignment of a well-known fragment is displaced,
emphasizing different notes than in the original. The musical context of the
copied expression is different, and, even though the musical expressions are
note-for-note the same, they manage to express something different than
they did in their original context. All of this means that the lay listener — presumably, you — has difficulty pinpointing from which works we have borrowed. It is similarity without recognizability. In copyright terms, it is literal
copying of an essential and vital part of a protected work without substantial
similarity (and so, it would seem to follow, without infringing copyright).
Such a failure of the lay listener test on copyright’s own terms ought
handily to illustrate why a simple listening standard for music copyright
infringement is an unsuitable arbiter of unlawful copying. Copied material
gets by the ear where it would not get by the letter of the law. While it would
be easy to dismiss all of this as merely academic, musical culture suggests
otherwise. As other copyright scholars have noted,74 in pop musical culture, the taking and adapting of others’ musical ideas is what drives innova73
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tion; copyright, by imposing liability for adaptations of existing works, sits
askew of this culture. On its face, the protection afforded to the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner would seem to demand that such substantial
reproduction constitute prima facie infringement — a conclusion that the
“recognizability test,” as currently understood, apparently fails to produce
in the case of our model composition. The test, then, runs counter to some
central claims of copyright. We cannot resist suggesting, in passing, that
this failure of copyright law is a victory for musical culture, but for now, our
intention is merely to identify this internal inconsistency.
The second scenario, where copying is questionable but some degree of
recognizability is easily perceived, demands that we reveal which works we
borrowed from in our earlier model composition. Here they are:
Figure 2.2
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For the purposes of this second scenario, let us suppose that we did not copy
the above works, but rather, by extraordinary coincidence, we composed a
work with such similarities to those of Nirvana, Beethoven, Wagner, and
Britney Spears.75 The question now becomes how familiarity affects recognizability. Listen to the work a few more times with these musical referential markers on which to focus. Eventually, the infringing melodies reveal
themselves to the ear, and, increasingly, they stand out from the rest of
the music; the piece becomes a series of quotations. In short, recognizing
a well-known melodic theme in a new musical context is possible, given
a sufficient number of listenings, and perhaps even easy when one knows
what to listen for.
A musical psychology study by Lucy Pollard-Gott showed the same
process as that described above, albeit in a more complex musical environment.76 Pollard-Gott based her study around Franz Liszt’s Sonata in B minor,
a tricky work in which three main musical ideas (named Theme A, Theme
B, and the Transfer Theme in the study) continuously reinvent themselves
in a twenty-five-minute solo piano piece. Theme A is heard as a melody,
later as a bass line, later again as a countermelody to another theme, and
so on, never quite the same but always similar. The other themes follow the
same pattern. The question Pollard-Gott asked was to what extent familiarity with a theme (say, Theme B) affects its recognizability in some modified
form (say, the sixth appearance of Theme B). She tested both musicians and
non-musicians. She found that, as listeners became more familiar with a
given theme and listened to varied versions of that theme, both musicians
and non-musicians were more able to identify elements of “theme structure”77 in variations. In plain language, the better someone knows a musical
theme, and in a context where she is asked to compare that theme to another, the more likely it is she will draw a link between the two themes and
deem them to be related, even when the two themes are somewhat dissimilar yet loosely share some common musical features.
This finding has tremendous implications for the lay listener test. First,
it suggests that the recognition of similarity is an acquired skill, not a stable
75
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binary yes/no response. Rather, no can become yes over time and repeated
listenings, to a point where the two themes need not be particularly alike in
order for connections to be drawn between them. Second, it suggests this
process is unidirectional; while no can become yes over time, yes cannot become no. Once points of similarity are drawn, a listener cannot go back to
a state of mind in which those connections do not exist. Our model composition is useful here again. Once you hear Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony
in the melody, there is no way to go back to not hearing that connection.
One’s attention is turned to comparing the melody around measure 7 of our
piece to Beethoven’s most famous theme simply by having the connection
suggested, and then encouraging repeated listenings. This is an example of
the “anchoring bias” described earlier. It is all too simple to create the conditions that favour a finding of recognizable similarity.
Thus, the question of “recognizability” of one work in another is not
as objective as the lay listener test purports to be; quite the contrary, one
can train people to hear connections between melodies, given sufficient
time. This does not bode well for composers falsely accused of infringement
where there is merely coincidental similarity, even where there are notable
differences in the musical themes or expressive details that the composer
might point to as evidence of independent creation. One might object that
this assessment pays insufficient heed to the significance of the differences
between the works. Perhaps so, but this only underscores the weakness of
the recognizability inquiry: greater recognition of similarity minimizes appreciation of differences. Put otherwise, if a plaintiff wishes to win an infringement case through the application of a lay listener test, the best thing
she can do is to play the two musical excerpts over and over again, building
irreversible similarity connections between the two melodies over time.
Eventually, everyone hears the “Smells Like Teen Spirit” chorus in our bass
line, even if it takes a while to get to that point. The differences correspondingly fade to insignificance.

D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
1) Music’s Lessons
Anyone who works with the law is used to dealing with the complexities
that necessarily arise when applying general legal rules to real-world situations. It is unremarkable to encounter legal uncertainties (“is this in-
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fringing?”) and normative indeterminacy (“should it be?”). Perhaps this
explains why copyright scholars, practitioners, and judges feel reasonably
confident examining music through the lens of law, notwithstanding the
complexity of the endeavour; but when we look back at law through the
lens of music, we see that our nicely articulated legal doctrine suffers from
more than typical legal uncertainty. The compositional example offered in
Section C presents fundamental practical and policy questions that merit
greater consideration.
On the practical side, it provokes us to ask how substantial similarity can be fairly assessed when the human perception of similarities is so
subjective, context-specific, and vulnerable to suggestion. Musical experts
may detect substantial copying and technical similarities where the lay ear
cannot. Moreover, the capacity to detect copying depends on many factors
including the music’s phraseology, complexity, and structure, and the listener’s knowledge, sophistication, and expectations. We have argued that
this challenges copyright’s “ordinary lay listener” test for determining unlawful copying. Not only is the test ill-suited to the legal task at hand, but it
is also virtually impossible to apply in light of its inevitable manipulability,
which is only exacerbated in a litigation context.
From a policy perspective, our illustration suggests, first, that extensive
copying may produce works that sound very different, and secondly, that
works may sound very similar even in the absence of copying. The first point
hints at a copyright policy conundrum: if substantial copying evades detection by the ordinary lay listener, but is otherwise evident, should infringement be found? If a composer borrows another’s musical melody and writes
it backwards, for example, an ordinary listener is unlikely to hear it, while
an educated musician will likely discern the copying upon examining the
score.78 Doctrinally speaking, it might seem that the first composer should
be entitled to claim infringement, but he is unlikely to succeed. Which result is correct? A proprietary understanding of the copyright interest might
lead us to conclude that substantial copying should attract liability even
where undetectable to the intended audience or the reasonable listener.79 A
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more consequentialist vision of copyright as an economic incentive to spur
creativity might inform a different response: where copying is not noticeable to the intended audience of the original work, then the copying will not
produce any harm to the market for the original. As such, there may be no
reason to prevent it.
These are, we think, interesting arguments deserving of more attention than we can give them here.80 For now, we note that the proprietary
approach sits uneasily with the Supreme Court of Canada’s “move away
from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive right of
authors . . .” to control their works in the marketplace.81 The Court’s recent
focus on the public interest, the dissemination of artistic works, and the development of “a robustly cultured and intellectual public domain”82 points
in favour of finding no infringement where musical borrowing is unrecognizable. In the absence of harm to the original author, the copyright balance
is not furthered by restricting the creative expression of a derivative author
and thereby depriving the public of the benefits of her creativity. This suggests an interesting possibility: the lay listener test may be unsatisfactory as
a basis for finding infringement; however, the lack of substantial similarity
to a layperson’s ear might be a sound basis on which to rule out infringement
on policy grounds.
The second scenario, where readily perceived similarities between two
works do not reflect unlawful copying, identifies a very real policy concern
for copyright law. It demonstrates that reliance on the reasonable listener
standard risks capturing within copyright’s domain independent creations
or public domain uses that ought to be unrestricted. It is critical that courts
are alive to this possibility and the threat that it represents both to the copyright system and to creative practices. The limits of copyright are as important to the proper functioning of the copyright system as the rights that
it protects. If we fail to draw the appropriate limits to copyright, we upset
the copyright balance by overcompensating owners while establishing un-
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necessary obstacles to creativity. For musicians whose creative activities
take shape under the shadow of potential legal liability — and often under
the watchful eye of risk-averse music publishers — the perceived need to
avoid any detectable similarity to pre-existing works can be stultifying. If
our legal standards do not accommodate the realities of musical creativity,
there is a very real risk that musical creativity will adapt and constrict in the
shadow of the law.
While our modest aim here has been to shine a light on the problems
with substantial similarity determinations in music infringement cases,
our critique illuminates some possible avenues towards improvement. Our
general plea is that copyright law must take into account the nature of the
creative musical practices that it purports to encourage. Jessica Litman famously pointed to “the gulf between what authors really do and the way the
law perceives them,”83 and warned that “we must guard against protecting
authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.”84 This warning is
extremely pertinent in the context of musical composition, which “has historically enjoyed a healthy diet of musical borrowings” and “has developed
its own informal rules for borrowing.”85
Given the technical nature and complexity of musical expression, one
key to improving the alignment between what composers do and the law
of copyright would be to more fully engage musical expertise in the substantiality determination.86 We agree with Lemley’s assertion that expert
evidence would be most usefully and appropriately employed in determining unlawful copying (analytically weeding out unprotected from protected
elements of a plaintiff’s work) rather than in assessing the probability of
copying as a matter of fact, for which a lay listener’s ear may be sufficient.87
Lemley compares the proposed role of the music expert to that of the soft-
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ware expert in the United States’ software cases, namely, assisting the court
with separating ideas from expression, filtering out other unprotectable
elements of the work, and then comparing the defendant’s work with the
plaintiff’s protected expression.88 Whether or not Canadian law embraces
the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" approach to software claims that
Lemley invokes, our courts have accepted that “some method must be found
to weed out or remove from copyright protection those portions which . . .
cannot be protected by copyright.”89
We also agree with Lemley that a better solution would be to employ
expert testimony and analytic dissection of the work in both prongs of the
substantial similarity test. Assessing the probative significance of discernible similarities could be greatly aided by expert evidence. And if the ordinary reasonable listener has any role to play in the second prong of the
analysis, we would restrict it, as already mentioned, to supporting a finding
in favour of the defendant where the copied portion is recognizable only to
expert eyes or ears, and not to the intended audience. After all, as Manta
notes, “the potential harm that infringement causes to copyright owners,
both financial and non-financial, results from the perceptions of those
members of the public who will encounter the works . . . .”90
Where reliance continues to be placed on the lay listener, there are ways
to alleviate some of the biases to which the test is prone. In particular, we
see some potential in Manta’s proposal that courts assessing similarity allow the use of survey evidence in copyright cases, similar to that used in
trademark litigation. Conducted correctly, and subject to the usual rules of
admissibility, a survey could offer a court more objective, scientific evidence
of the extent of similarities perceived by the intended audience.91 Surveys
would assist the decision maker to separate her own perception of the material from the question of fact at hand, and would minimize the impact of
cognitive biases, such as hindsight or anchoring bias, on the infringement
inquiry.
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Delrina Corp, above note 24 at para 43 [citation omitted]; see also Preston, above note 48.
Manta, above note 53 at 1347 [footnote omitted].
Ibid at 1346; this is also consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s acknowledgement of the value of surveys in Masterpiece v Alavida Lifestyle, 2011 SCC 27, namely, “to
provide empirical evidence which demonstrates consumer reactions in the marketplace — exactly the question that the trial judge is addressing . . . .” at para 93.
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Perhaps above all, what is needed is an attitudinal shift away from the
law’s idea of ownership and exclusive control and towards a more nuanced
understanding of the creative works at issue, and the creative process from
which they emerge. The law must afford sufficient space for musical inspiration, influence, and transformation; this space should not be confined only
to the zone of fair dealing (wherein the defendant must defend her actions
on limited statutory grounds or be held liable92), but should also inform the
law’s approach to determining prima facie infringement.93 We must resist
the idea that every recognizable similarity is both legally probative of copying and legally relevant to establishing infringement. Moreover, it should
be accepted that what constitutes “substantial similarity” may vary across
different expressive forms in accordance with the norms and conventions
of the relevant creative community. Formulating a more fine-tuned approach to infringement is thus an important piece of a much larger puzzle.

2) The Value of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Music
Copyright
This volume is intended to demonstrate the importance and critical value
of interdisciplinary approaches to copyright scholarship. With this in mind,
we conclude with some final thoughts about the complementarity of music
and law as areas of intellectual inquiry. Music theory can help correct some
common misunderstandings and sharpen general perceptions. By cutting
through musical illusions, it might help to identify copying where it is
hidden. More importantly, it tempers the possibility of false infringement
findings and the overreach of copyright in cases where common musical
devices are employed to similar aural effect. In a world where people learn
to separate general ideas from specific expressions in everyday language
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The space opened up for downstream users by the fair dealing defence has been dramatically expanded by recent developments in Canada. In Bell, above note 39, the Supreme
Court of Canada identified as an important goal of fair dealing “to allow users to employ
copyrighted works in a way that helps them engage in their own acts of authorship
and creativity” at para 21. The defence remains available only for dealings for purposes
expressly enumerated in the Act. As such, many creative uses of musical works will not
benefit from the extended reach of fair dealing.
David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), describing
the “overall goal” of the substantial part determination in terms of a balance between
encouraging the production and dissemination of creative work and allowing “public
access to and use of a work for socially desirable ends” at 188.
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but not in the language of music, music theorists can restore this core copyright concept to the judicial treatment of musical works. Additionally, the
insights offered by musical psychology reveal how inexact and manipulable
are laypersons’ hearing senses, and how overconfident we tend to be in our
own musical interpretations and conclusions. These revelations suggest
the possibility of improved models for gauging similarities built upon the
knowledge of how musical listening really works. Finally, a greater appreciation of the actual practice of musical composition promises a more
informed discussion about the appropriate role and limits of copyright protection in the musical realm.
While these music lessons may leave the reader with more questions
than answers, the fact that music theory turns our attention to such questions, shining a revealing light on the assumptions at play, surely speaks
to its value and potential importance for copyright law. If nothing else, we
hope to have demonstrated that a critical analysis of copyright’s recognizability test is enriched by a technical analysis of musical structures and
compositional practices, combined with an appreciation of the complex
nature of music perception. Attention to musical disciplines and the lessons they afford holds the promise of a better copyright system than the one
we have today — a system that more carefully calibrates copyright’s norms
and processes with the norms of musical communities and the processes of
musical creativity.

